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The value of sales by foreign affiliates of multinational firms now exceeds global exports
of goods and services (UNCTAD, 1996). The observed growth in foreign direct
investment (FDI) is a consequence of many changes in the world economy. Falling costs
of communication have eased the constraints on global rationalization of production,
leading to ever greater geographic specialization and international splicing of the
production (value added) chain. Increased outsourcing and the information technology
revolution have created markets for an ever expanding set of new services. Often such
services cannot be traded, or suppliers must have a physical presence in a market in order
to compete efficiently, further expanding FDI flows.
Market-driven changes in the economic environment  have been complemented by
changes in policies. Perceptions about multinational firms and their effects on host
countries have undergone a transformation.  Most countries are now quite eager to attract
FDI; many offer financial incentives to attract FDI and have concluded bilateral
investment treaties (BITs). As of 1999, over 1,600 BITs have been negotiated, compared
to some 400 at the beginning of 1990 (UNCTAD, 1997). On the other hand, many
countries continue to subject multinationals to performance requirements. For example,
multinationals may have to comply with local content, export or technology transfer
requirements. The schizophrenic nature of the overall policy environment reflects the
guarded optimism with which many countries continue to view the entry of multinational
firms into their territory.
At the 1996 WTO Ministerial meeting in Singapore, a working group on trade and
investment was created to examine the relationship between trade and investment
policies. A number of countries are in favor of introducing disciplines on investment
policies into the WTO; others are opposed. This paper asks whether there is a strong case
for developing countries to support the creation of a multilateral agreement on
investment. We identify a number of potential gains from cooperation:
*  Policies restricting entry by foreign firms may be welfare-reducing (resulting
producer rents are less than consumer losses). If local incumbents capturing
the rents are able to block FDI liberalization, an international agreement that
grants foreign firms better market access or a "level playing field" could be
beneficial to both host and source countries.
*  Countries pursuing socially optimal policies may impose negative spillovers
on other countries, or lead to an inefficient noncooperative outcome for the
world as a whole (e.g., a prisoner's dilemma). Possible examples are tax and
subsidy competitions between governments and locational distortions created
by regional integration agreements (RIAs) that encourage investment in
"hub" countries and discriminate against FDI originating in non-members.
*  Governments seeking to attract FDI may be pursuing all the "right" policies
without generating a significant "supply response" because of a history of
1policy reversals. If investors are risk averse, they may avoid the country
altogether, impose large risk premia, not transfer "sensitive" technologies,
etc. International agreement may then serve as a mechanism through which
governments make irrevocable commitments and "guarantees" against policy
reversals, thereby anchoring expectations of investors.
*  Firms may confront significant transactions costs and uncertainty resulting
from differences in national rules and bilateral investment treaties (BITs).
*  Agreeing to investment disciplines can be a useful as a quid pro quo for a
"grand bargain" that addresses major concerns of developing countries.
*  The current hodge-podge of disciplines found in WTO agreements for goods
as opposed to services makes little sense-it  would be better to devise a set of
common rules that are not product-specific, but activity-specific.
We conclude that although some of these potential rationales are compelling in
principle, none justify multilateral negotiations on investment policies at this time. For
the WTO process to "work", foreign firms seeking better access to markets must be able
to offer incentives to domestic groups in order to mobilize them to oppose existing
restrictions. As developing countries are large net importers of FDI, this implies that the
negotiating agenda must be expanded to include trade and other issues that allow side
payments to be made to the relevant groups. In principle, this is readily done in the WTO
context; indeed, it is one of the institution's major strengths and a source of potential
gains for developing countries (Hoekman, 1989).  However, existing agreements already
provide ample scope to pursue liberalization of FDI in the area where this matters most-
services. The WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) includes FDI as a
mode of supply, and enormous scope still exists to liberalize FDI in services. We
conclude that priority should be given to expanding the coverage of the GATS before
seeking to negotiate general disciplines on investment policies.
The negative spillover case for cooperation is weak. Many studies conclude that
investment policies are largely redundant (ineffective). If so, there should be no spillovers
and governments should simply refrain from pursuing discriminatory FDI policies.
Recent deliberations in the WTO Working Group illustrate that many governments
believe incentives are effective and important instruments to attract FDI, and some
studies support that view. If so, negative spillovers are certainly possible, but, if there are
positive externalities for host countries due to FDI, it may make good sense for
governments to compete for it. This is because their rivalry could lead to a better
allocation of FDI than might arise in the absence of such competition. Thus, whether
incentives work or not, there is no clear case for international cooperation that restricts
the ability of governments to pursue national policies.
Governments  may also pursue policies that aim to shift profits from foreign firms
to the host economy. If successful, this is to the detriment of source countries. As
developing countries are not major exporters of FDI, this is a zero-sum type of game: no
cooperative solution exists if the negotiating agenda is limited to investment policies
2only. Expanding the negotiating set to include issues of interest to developing countries
can in principle allow an agreement to be crafted that improves the welfare of all parties.
However, when markets can be contested effectively via exports, strategic profit-shifting
investment policies can only be effective if they are supported by restrictive trade policies
(or else foreign firms can always opt for exporting). The further the WTO goes in
reducing and binding trade barriers, the less scope there is for profit-shifting policies to
be effective. Thus, profit-shifting-related externalities can largely be addressed through
existing WTO mechanisms under the GATT and the GATS.
Countries that have credibility problems can seek to address these through a wide
variety of actions, including using existing international institutions such as the WTO and
international institutions that provide arbitration services. The WTO offers ample scope
to bind trade-related policies, as well as investment restrictions for services. Most
countries are far from utilizing them fully. This suggests that credibility may not be as
important to governments as is sometimes argued or that international agreement is not an
effective vehicle for overcoming political opposition to actions that reduce the scope for
government intervention. Policy-related transactions costs will be relatively minor for
multinationals compared to all the other costs associated with FDI and do not justify
multilateral harnonization attempts.
The "grand bargain" argument has always been a raison d'etre of the WTO. While
valid in principle, it is not clear that investment policies are that valuable a "negotiating
chip" for developing countries compared to, e.g., liberalization of trade under existing
agreements (GATT and GATS). Investment may prove useful at the margin, but much
can already be brought to the table by utilizing existing mechanisms. Finally, the
architectural argument is perhaps the most compelling rationale for launching
negotiations. But in that case the issue should be framed in architectural terms, aiming at
a redesign of the WTO in toto.
Given that there exists ample room to pursue liberalization via existing
agreements, we conclude that priority should be given to continuing the process of
multilateral trade liberalization, focusing attention as far as investment (establishment)
policies are concerned in sectors where FDI is critical as a mode to contest markets, i.e.,
services. The GATS already covers investment as a mode of supply for which market
access and national treatment commitments can be made on a sector-specific basis. Thus,
a large proportion of the potential gains from negotiations focusing on liberalization of
FDI can be realized through full exploitation of existing multilateral instruments.
The paper is organized as follows. We start with a brief discussion of the rationale
for policies that restrict FDI and summarize existing WTO rules and disciplines (Section
2). We then turn to the "spillover" case for international cooperation and discuss the
economic rationale for financial and fiscal incentives designed to attract FDI  (Section 3).
Next, we turn to the issue of discrimination arising from RIAs (Section 4), followed by
the case for international agreement as a strategy to gain credibility and the transaction
costs argument (Sections 5 and 6). The "grand bargain" and WTO architecture arguments
3are the focus of Sections 7 and 8. The recent OECD effort to negotiate a Multilateral
Agreement on Investment (MAI) is discussed in Section 9. We then summarize the
implications of our argument for the value to developing countries of a  stand-alone
multilateral agreement on FDI at this time (Section 10) and offer some concluding
remarks (Section 11).
2. Restrictive Policies Toward FDI: Market Access
Policies toward FDI exhibit considerable  variation over time and space. In countries that
historically emphasized import substituting industrialization, FDI was typically not
allowed or multinational firms had to operate under severe restrictions. Even in countries
where technology acquisition was a major concern of governments, multinationals were
rarely permitted to operate wholly owned subsidiaries. For example, Japan, Korea, and
Taiwan imposed restrictions on FDI at various points in time, even though foreign trade
was viewed positively.
In recent years, government policies toward FDI have been liberalized across the
world (UNCTAD, 1992). This trend reflects an increasing awareness on the part of many
governments that multinational firms play an important role in economic development by
serving as conduits of superior technology as well as management techniques. While
there has been an overall change of attitude towards FDI, many countries-both
industrialized and developing-continue  to restrict the conduct of multinationals and/or
subject them to various performance yardsticks. Examples include equity ownership
limits, licensing regimes and export or local content requirements. In other words, the
perception seems to be that while increased FDI is desirable, the conduct of multinational
firms may have to be subjected to  regulations and restrictions in order to maximize
benefits for the host country-assuming  such indeed is the motivation behind the various
measures instituted by host countries.
Investment measures have tended to be concentrated in specific industries with
automotive, chemical, and petrochemical and computer industries leading the list
(UNCTAD, 1996). Local content requirements are most important in the auto industry
(Pursell, 1999); export requirements are more important in the computer industry. In
chemicals and petrochemicals, local content requirements and export requirements are
employed extensively. The type of policy often depends on whether FDI is resource-
seeking, domestic market oriented, or export-oriented (Caves, 1996).
Economic theory dictates that when domestic distortions and externalities from
FDI are both absent, the optimal FDI policy ought to be no policy at all-i.e.
governments should allow for unfettered market transactions. For example, under perfect
competition, domestic content protection raises the price of domestic inputs, by requiring
multinationals to use more of them, and thus benefit input suppliers at the expense of
final goods producers (Grossman, 1981). For there to be a rationale for policies restricting
FDI there must be domestic policy distortions or market failures. Since multinational
firms typically arise in oligopolistic industries, the usual example of a market failure is
4the presence of imperfect competition in the host economy.' Multinational enterprises
(MNEs) may have market power and use this to extract rents from the host economy. Or
they may maximize profits by engaging in practices that limit "leakage" of know-how to
competing local firms.
Analyses of content protection and export performance requirements under
conditions of imperfect competition (Richardson 1991; 1993; Rodrik 1987) illustrate that
the welfare effects of such policies may not be necessarily negative. 2 However, in most
situations more efficient instruments than investment measures can be identified to
address a market failure, including vigorous competition policies. In the case of domestic
policy distortions, the optimal policy is well known: remove them at the source, if
necessary through appropriately designed regulatory intervention that is applied on a
nondiscriminatory basis (i.e., applies equally to both foreign and domestic firms). Thus,
rather than use investment policies to offset the effects of high protection, adoption of
low and uniform tariffs would be preferable. This point of view is implicit in the WTO,
which not only aims at progressive liberalization of trade, but also prohibits the use of
most trade-related investment measures (TRIMs).
In the Uruguay Round an agreement on TRIMs was negotiated that prohibits
measures that are inconsistent with the GATT national treatment principle (Art. III) or the
prohibition on the use of quantitative restrictions (Art. XI). The TRIMs agreement
includes a list of prohibited measures (including local content, trade-balancing, foreign
exchange-balancing and domestic sales requirements), requires that all policies not in
conformity with the agreement be notified within 90 days of entry into force of the
agreement, and that they be eliminated within two, five or seven years, for industrialized,
developing and least developed countries, respectively. The agreement is to be reviewed
in the year 2000 at which time it may be complemented  by provisions on competition and
investment policy (Low and Subramanian, 1996).
It is sometimes not realized that the TRIMs agreement does not go beyond
existing GATT rules-it  simply re-iterates that the GATT national treatment principle
and the prohibition of quantitative restrictions apply to trade-related investment policies.
These disciplines are quite powerful. The GATT has been a constraint on countries using
TRIMs, and can be expected to become a more serious source of discipline in future as
Uruguay Round transition periods for developing countries expire. A recent case brought
by the EU, Japan and the US against provisions of the National Car Program introduced
' However,  this is not required.  The standard  example  of a policy  distortion  is trade  protection.  Consider  a
developing  country  with  protection  on the capital  intensive  good in a standard  two  sector,  two  factor
model.  Allowing  in foreign  capital  causes  the output  mix to shift  towards  the capital  intensive  sector,  so
that imports  of the capital  intensive  good and  therefore  tariff  revenues  fall. This  reduces  welfare  because
each  unit of imports  is worth  more  inside  the country  than its cost  from  world  markets  (Hamada,  1974;
Minabe,  1974).  For papers  that explore  these  types  of models  in greater  depth,  see  Bhagwati  and  Brecher
(1980),  Brecher  and Diaz-Alejandro  (1977)  and Brecher  and Findlay  (1983).
2 As is well  known,  in  the presence  of pre-existing  distortions,  introducing  another  distortion,  say in  the
form of a content  protection  scheme,  can raise  welfare.
5by Indonesia in 1996 may be indicative of the future. Under the contested program, the
government granted "National Car" company status to Indonesian  companies that met
specified criteria as to ownership of facilities,  use of trademarks, and technology. National
Cars companies were required to meet increasing  local content requirements over a three
year period; if so, they benefited  from exemption  from the prevailing luxury tax on  sales of
cars and exemption from import duties on parts and components. "National Cars"
manufactured  in a foreign country by Indonesian  nationals and which fulfilled  the local
content requirements  prescribed by the Minister  of Industry and Trade were also exempt
from import duties and luxury tax. Such imported National Cars were deemed to comply
with the 20 per cent local content requirement  for the end of the first production year if the
value of "counter-purchased"  Indonesian  parts and components accounted  for at least 25 per
cent of the value of the imported cars (WTO, 1  998b). The panel found that this program
violated the TRIMs Agreement (national  treatment).
More disputes may arise under the TRIMs agreement once the transition periods
for full compliance on the part of developing countries have expired. A major reason
Indonesia was "targeted" was that the policy measures were introduced after the entry
into force of the TRIMs agreement. A number of countries apply similar policies but are
sheltered by the transition period.
While in many situations TRIMs are second best instruments, policy intervention
in oligopolistic markets can improve local welfare by altering the distribution of product
market rents between domestic and foreign firms. Policy may also be driven by
distributional concerns. Suppose, following Glass and Saggi (1999b), one imagines an
economy with an oligopolistic sector (manufacturing)  and a numeraire sector
(agriculture). Inward FDI into the manufacturing sector generates increased demand for
skilled labor, which benefits skilled workers through raising wages in the host country
but consequently damages the profits of host firms (positive due to imperfect
competition). The tension between wages and profits implies that government policies
toward FDI benefit one group at the expense of the other and the relative importance of
the welfare of the two groups (as captured in the government's objective) then determines
the policy stance implemented by the government. If the economic environment of a
country is such that profits of local firms are unimportant because local industries are
largely foreign owned (so that national income largely consists of wage eamings), the
country is likely to take a favorable view of inward FDI: the loss in profits accruing to
domestic agents incurred due to the increased entry of multinationals is small relative to
the benefit accruing to workers. However, when local profits matter, the policy stance
toward FDI may be more restrictive.
There are therefore circumstances where the optimal policy may be to restrict
FDI. If all countries pursue such policies, the outcome will typically be inefficient from a
world welfare point of view. Cooperation that involves agreement not to restrict FDI can
then be Pareto improving. Alternatively, the situation may be zero sum, in which case
there are no gains from cooperation. If so, any international agreement will have to
6extend beyond investment policies to allow side payments to be made (more on this
below).
A necessary condition for cooperation  to be beneficial is that restrictive policies
have their intended effect. In many cases, surveys show that investment measures require
firms to take actions that they would have taken anyway. For example, a policy that
requires finns to export is inconsequential if firms were going to export even in the
absence of such a requirement. Surveys by the US Department of Commerce for 1977
and 1982 indicated that only six percent of all the overseas affiliates of US firms felt
constrained by TRIMs such as local content requirements, although a far greater
percentage operated in sectors where TRIMs existed. In other words, TRIMs often failed
to bind (UTNCTC,  1991a).
Of course, TRIMs are just part of the relevant policy landscape, and the forgoing
surveys do not take account of the firms that might have invested but decided not to
because of TRIMs. Investment measures are often general, not trade-related. Many
countries apply licensing and approval regimes and impose related "red tape" costs on
foreign investors. They may also prohibit entry through FDI altogether, or impose equity
ownership restrictions. Such policies may reflect welfare-enhancing attempts to shift
foreign profits to the domestic economy or welfare-reducing  rent-seeking activities by
bureaucrats and their constituents. Sometimes the effect of policies is simply to waste
real resources (so-called frictional costs-see  Baldwin, 1994). The TRIMs agreement
does not apply to such non-trade-related  policies, nor does it affect service industries. The
latter are covered by the GATS, however, which extends to FDI policies in that countries
can make specific market access and national treatment commitments for this "mode of
supply" for any or all services.
Investment policies that seek to transfer rents from foreign to domestic firms or
other constituencies are discussed further in Section 3, as they are one potential source of
negative policy spillovers. Whatever the economic rationality of restrictive policies, the
available empirical evidence suggests that local content and related policies are
ineffective and costly to the economy-they  do not achieve the desired backward and
forward linkages, encourage inefficient foreign entry, and create potential problems for
future liberalization as those who enter lobby against a change in regime (Moran, 1998).
Governments that recognize that status quo FDI policies are costly to the economy may
face political impediments in eliminating them because protected industries are able to
prevent their abolition. International agreement may be valuable in helping to overcome
this resistance.
Any rents associated with restrictive FDI policies will be eroded in tradable
industries if a liberal trade policy stance is pursued, as foreign firms can then contest the
market through exports. This suggests priority be given to trade liberalization and trade
facilitation efforts (enhancing the efficiency of customs clearance and port services). If
trade barriers are low, domestic industry will not have as large an incentive to support
restrictive FDI regulations (restrictions on inward FDI may be motivated in part by the
7existence of high trade barriers, as this provides an incentive for tariff-wall hopping FDI).
More generally, if multilateral negotiations on investment policies are to assist
governments seeking to liberalize or improve FDI policies, the negotiating agenda will
have to include topics that are of sufficient interest to the relevant domestic groups to
induce them to support a pro-reform agenda. Limiting tradeoffs within the investment
policy area is unlikely to be effective in this regard for most developing countries as they
are primarily "importers" of FDI. Given an absence of FDI "export" interests, the
necessary carrots will lie outside the investment area. 3
In the case of nontradables such as many service industries, liberalization of entry
and operating restrictions is of much greater importance in terms of market access than it
is for tradables. In many cases local incumbent firms will be enjoying significant rents,
and will oppose new entry by foreign firms. Here again there is a potential rationale for
multilateral negotiations, as the desire of foreign firms for market access can be used as a
tool to promote liberalization, but here again there may be a need to expand the
negotiation set to include other issues.
3. Market Failures and International Spillovers
Investment-related policies may reflect attempts to shift rents from source to host
countries or a desire to secure benefits to the local economy that may potentially go
elsewhere .Both types of policies can create international spillovers and provide a basis
for international cooperation.  I
Investmentpolicies with strategic objectives
Since multinational firms are pervasive in oligopolistic industries, incentives to
shift profits or rents from MNEs to the host economy are not a mere theoretical
possibility. The distribution of rents between governments and large multinationals has
always been a classic controversy. In contrast to industrialized countries, where two way
flows of FDI are large, developing countries are large net importers of FDI and it is
precisely in developing countries that multinationals have been controversial. Most
developing countries do not export any FDI at all and are unlikely to do for quite some
time into the future. Thus, developing countries squarely represent only the host country
view of FDI. Consequently, it will be very difficult to devise an international agreement
on investment that is welfare-enhancing for developing countries that successfully
3 Developed countries with large stocks of two-way FDI should in principle find it easier to achieve gains
from cooperation that is limited to FDI policies as each will be both a source and destination country.
4 In a multi-country world, a selective use of investment incentives can also have strategic consequences.
An exporting foreign firm from a third country (or a local host firm) may find itself at a disadvantage with
respect to a foreign firm that experiences a decline its cost due to an investment incentive. Thus, the
dichotomy between incentives and strategic investment policies is not clear cut. The distinction is made
here to isolate the primary motivation behind each policy: incentives are intended to lure in multinationals
while policies restricting their behavior are means for altering the distribution of rents. See Glass and Saggi
(1999b) for a model in which investment subsidies have strategic consequences. Of course, discrimination
via taxation can also have rent shifting consequences.
8employ policy strategically. In this case a cooperative solution requires that the
negotiating agenda be expanded to include issues of interest to developing countries
(Hoekman, 1989). Of course, it is not clear how many countries are in this group-as  has
been emphasized repeatedly in the literature, in practice it will be very difficult for
policymakers to apply such policies well. The informational requirements are very
substantial, policies can easily be captured by industries, and account must be taken of the
reactions of affected firms and their home governments. The best rule of thumb for
policymakers  to apply  in most  situations  is to refrain from pursuing  strategic  policies.
5
Whether strategic investment policies are applied or not, they are bound to be
second-best tools from an economic viewpoint if the products involved are tradable. The
reason is quite straightforward-the  realization of profit-shifting objectives requires trade
policy instruments. If a country pursues free trade, investment measures will have only a
limited effect at best, as foreign firms can choose to service the market through trade
instead of FDI.  Only to the extent exports are a second best means of servicing markets
will investment policies shift rents toward domestic firms. Conversely, if trade policy has
a strategic objective, investment measures are redundant. The implication of this is that
the existing WTO is the main instrument through which to pursue efforts to discipline
strategic FDI policies for tradable industries. From this perspective it is not surprising
that TRIMs are covered by the GATT (and have been from the very start). 6
Sometimes FDI is the only means of servicing a market. If so, foreign firns  may
have to suffer the consequences of strategic investment policies without any possible
recourse to trade. 7 Thus, an investment agreement may be needed primarily in the case of
services. The question then becomes what can one expect from an investment agreement
relative to GATS.
Investment Incentives
Incentives may be justified if there exist externalities from FDI. For example,
developing countries hope FDI will generate technological spillovers for local firms
thereby making more efficient use of existing resources. 8 There exists a large literature
that tries to determine whether or not host countries enjoy 'spillovers'  (positive
' It is quite easy  to get  it wrong even in circumstances  where the optimal policy appears straightforward.
See for example the case study of Madagascar's policy towards controlling exports of vanilla (De Melo,
Olarreaga and Takacs, 1999).
6 If FDI is in the import-competing sector, then the trade policy to use to tax FDI is an import-subsidy-
something that is not of concern to the WTO. If FDI is in the export-competing sector, a tariff can shift
resources from foreign affiliates to domestic factors in other sectors (Olarreaga, 1998). A binding free trade
regime locked in through the WTO would not allow this.
' One common policy has been to favor joint ventures relative to wholly owned subsidiaries. Whether such
policies are motivated by the desire to force multinationals to share rents with local partners or to
encourage technology transfer to local firms (or both) is not clear. What is clear is that, if left free to
choose, multinationals usually prefer wholly owned subsidiaries,  hiring any local expertise that is needed
directly in the form of employees rather than acquiring it via a partnership.
8 The usage of the word 'spillovers'  is somewhat unfortunate since productivity improvements are unlikely
to be costless and automatic.
9externalities) from FDI (Caves, 1996; Blomstrom and Kokko, 1997; and Markusen, 1998
provide excellent surveys). The central difficulty is that spillovers, by their very nature,
often do not leave a paper trail-they  are externalities that the market fails to take into
account. At a general level, the literature suggests the following potential channels of
spillovers:
*  Demonstration effects - local firms may adopt technologies introduced by the
multinational through imitation or reverse-engineering.
*  Labor turnover - workers trained by the multinational may transfer important
information to local firms or may start their own firms leading to diffusion of
technology.
*  Linkages - derived demand (both upstream and downstream) by multinationals may
lead to local provision of services or inputs that can also be used by local firms.
In its simplest form, the demonstration  effect argument states that the close
proximity to multinational firms may lead to efficiency gains by local firms who may
modify their own production methods upon exposure to the superior technology of
multinationals. One must be careful, however since a mere expansion in choices need not
imply externalities, especially if incentives for adoption are also affected by multinational
enterprises (MNEs). FDI may expand the choice set but it generally also increases
competition, so that the net effect on the incentive to adopt new technologies is
ambiguous (Glass and Saggi, 1  999a). However, if competition reinforces the incentives
for adoption, FDI may indeed spur local incentives (Das, 1987; Wang and Blomstrom,
1992).
Some empirical support for positive effects is found by Blomstrom, Kokko
and Zejan (1994) and Blomstrom and Persson (1983). Studies using firm level data are
less supportive of the spillover hypothesis: Aitken, Hanson, and Harrison (1997) and
Haddad and Harrison (1993) actually find that foreign investment has a negative effect on
the performance of domestically owned firms. One needs to be cautious in interpreting
these findings. Case-study evidence is strongly suggestive of spillovers (see Schive,
1990) and a more complete econometric study would require a more dynamic approach:
it is very unlikely that significant improvements in the productivity of local firms can be
realized without costly investments that yield payoffs in the future.
The type of FDI may also matter importantly. Djankov and Hoekman (1999) find
that foreign investment has a negative spillover effect on firms in Czech industry that do
not have foreign partnerships. This effect is relatively large and statistically significant.
However, if joint ventures are excluded and the focus of attention is restricted to the
impact of majority-owned foreign affiliates (i.e., FDI) on all other firms in an industry
(including joint ventures), the magnitude of the negative effect becomes much smaller
and loses statistical significance. This result illustrates that the initial negative spillover
result may not be robust and that tests for spillovers with the methodology used in the
literature require some assurance that in distinguishing between two subsets of firms in an
10industry on the basis of whether or not there is foreign ownership one is not ignoring
other important determinants of the performance of firms such as the technological effort
of firms. Survey questionnaires reveal that joint venture firns invested significantly more
in training and new technologies than pure "domestic" firms. It may be that the
technological ability of the firms without foreign partners is too low to be able to absorb
spillovers when they occur, or that the firms with foreign linkages have absorbed a
significant share of the available stock of labor with requisite skills.
Empirical evidence regarding the magnitude of labor turnover from multinationals
to local firms is mixed. Gershenberg (1987) finds limited evidence of labor turnover from
multinationals to local Kenyan firms, while studies of Asian economies document
substantial labor turnover from multinational to local firms(UNCTAD, 1992, Bloom,
1992, Pack, 1997). These conflicting findings may reflect the fact that in countries such
as South Korea and Taiwan, local competitors are less disadvantaged relative to their
counterparts than in many African economies, thereby making labor turnover possible.
Thus, the ability of local firms to absorb the technologies introduced by multinationals
may be a key determinant of whether or not labor turnover occurs as a means of
technology transfer in equilibrium (Glass and Saggi, 1998).
Several recent studies document that multinationals pay higher wages than local
firms. Using data from Mexico, Venezuela, and United States, Aitken, Harrison, and
Lipsey (1995) show that higher levels of foreign investment are associated with higher
wages in all three countries. The implication of this fact is that if multinationals raise
wages in order to restrict technology transfer to local firms and given that the wage
premium has no necessary relation to the social value of the knowledge embodied in
workers, technology transfer is not necessarily optimal for the local economy. Thus,
policies to encourage technology transfer may not raise welfare of the recipient country.
Finally, multinationals may generate externalities through backward and forward
linkages. Rodriguez Clare (1996) makes the important point that multinationals improve
welfare only if they generate linkages over and beyond those generated by local firms
they displace. Markusen and Venables (1999) have argued that the entry of multinationals
might help resolve a coordination failure in the host economy. By creating demand for
intermediate goods, entry by multinationals encourages their production. Consequently,
local firms gain access to hitherto unavailable inputs since these are not produced in the
absence of the demand generated by multinationals. Such an argument is probably most
relevant for the least developed countries that have very little industrial activity of their
own. Countries like India and Brazil that have adequate indigenous industry are less
likely to enjoy substantial linkage effects of this kind. In both types of countries increased
imports of intermediate inputs following MNE entry and more general trade liberalization
can enhance the process of industrialization (Puga and Venables, 1998).
Although an economic rationale for providing incentives to FDI exists in the
presence of domestic distortions or positive externalities, the empirical evidence
regarding the efficacy of financial incentives to attract FDI is ambiguous due to the nature
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in local firms is unlikely). If one accepts the notion that there is a solid economic case for
promoting inward FDI via incentives because of positive externalities, countries may find
themselves in a bidding war for attracting FDI. This can be to the detriment of the parties
involved if it leads to "excessive payment" to the investor. If this is an important
possibility, there is a potential case for international cooperation to ban or discipline the
use of fiscal incentives.
Clearly a key issue is whether fiscal incentives are effective. Many studies have
concluded that offering fiscal incentives  to inward FDI is not effective once the
fundamentals that determine FDI are taken into account (see Caves, 1996 for a survey).
These studies suggest financial incentives basically end up as transfers to multinationals
without influencing location decisions. If this is true it implies that there is no good case
for international cooperation: if financial incentives are ineffective, there is no rationale
for seeking multilateral disciplines prohibiting fiscal incentives as it is in each countries
self-interest not to offer them. From an efficiency stand point, if fiscal incentives fail to
alter the pattern of FDI, they fail to be distortionary. On the other hand, it is precisely
when such incentives fail to attract FDI that the developing countries have the most to
gain from refraining to use them: in such situations they are pure transfers from
developing countries to multinationals.
Government officials are often not convinced of the inefficacy of incentives, as
illustrated by statements by a number of representatives in the WTO Working Group on
Trade and Investment (WTO, 1  998a). To some extent this may reflect differences in
views regarding what is meant by an incentive. Of great importance is to distinguish
between fiscal and financial incentives and more general policies that promote business
activity. That the latter matter a lot in attracting investment is uncontested-they  are a
key dimension of the economic fundamentals. 9 Clearly there is also a rationale for the
pursuit of policies that will facilitate the adoption and adaptation of know-how. Such
general (horizontal) incentives that apply across-the-board are a key element in defining
the business environment, and are an important determinant of the "fundamentals" that
prevail in an economy (e.g., the absence of red tape; adequate infrastructure; training and
education programs, etc.). It is important to make a distinction between fiscal or financial
incentives that are firm-specific, and these more general economy-wide policies.
That being said, there is some evidence that suggests fiscal incentives do have an
effect on location decisions, especially for export-oriented FDI, although it is by no
means the key factor (Guisinger et al.1985, Hines, 1996, Devereux and Griffiths, 1998).lo
There are also models in the agglomeration literature that generate low-level equilibrium
9 As illustrated in a recent empirical analysis of the effect of US state-level policies on the location of
manufacturing investment. Holmes (1998) found that the share of manufacturing in employment in states
with pro-business regulatory environments increases by one third compared to a bordering state without
such policies.
10  Fiscal incentives are found to be unimportant for FDI geared towards the domestic market. This type of
FDI is more sensitive to the extent to which it will benefit from import protection.
12"traps" and provide a rationale for incentives in order to get over a critical mass threshold
required to attract firms to a location. Given the difficulty of quantifying the positive
externalities associated with inward FDI, determining the optimal incentive is obviously
very difficult. But in principle, if governments compete for FDI, this can help ensure that
FDI goes to those locations where it is most highly valued. This economic case for
"'subsidy  freedom" has been made by Bond and Samuelson (1986), who argue that
incentive competition can act as an efficient signaling device that improves the allocation
of investment across  jurisdictions by ensuring that FDI moves to where it has the highest
social return. Note that in such situations governments should pursue policies on a
nondiscriminatory basis-in  particular, abiding by the national treatment principle and
adopting a right of establishment would appear to be appropriate.
This is not to say, of course, that locational competition is not detrimental to
developing countries. Of particular concem are efforts by high income countries to retain
or attract FDI that would be more efficiently employed in developing countries. Labor
unions and groups representing the interests of local communities may oppose plant
closures and efforts by firms to transplant facilities. Similar motivations underlie the use
of trade policy instruments such as antidumping. It is important to distinguish between
locational competition which may be efficient and locational competition that relies on
the use of trade policy such as antidumping. The latter is inherently inefficient in focusing
on the protection of industries that cannot compete and inducing a variety of ancillary
distortions that are well documented in the literature (e.g., Finger, 1993).
The foregoing suggests there are valid reasons to question the rationale for an
agreement that seeks to discipline incentives .If incentives are ineffective, there are no
real negative spillovers. If they are effective, a good case can be made for subsidy
freedom. The latter argument is bolstered by practical considerations: it will be very
difficult to enforce any agreement that restricts locational incentives as governments have
multiple instruments available, including their tax regimes.
4. Spillovers Associated With Regional Integration
Some RIAs have extended the reach of national treatment to investors from partner
countries, in the process abolishing performance criteria and related policies such as local
content and trade balancing requirements. Examples include the EU, where freedom of
investment is a basic principle, NAFTA, and various association agreements the EU has
concluded with Central and Eastern European neighbors. Insofar as RIAs lead to
discrimination between insiders and outsiders in terms of FDI policies, they impose
negative externalities over and above whatever investment "diversion" occurs because of
the preferential liberalization of trade barriers. Eliminating this discrimination can be a
powerful argument in favor of multilateral rules. An important empirical question is
whether such discrimination occurs and how large it is. This is very difficult to
determine, as it requires careful and detailed assessments of the applicable legislation on
both a horizontal and sector-by-sector basis. Some agreements-e.g.,  the EC and some of
the agreements it in turn has negotiated with neighboring countries-embody  a right of
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requiring national treatment (often subject to exceptions-negative  lists) and disciplining
the use of performance requirements. Given the role of regulation and the political
sensitivity associated with foreign ownership of many service industries, one way of
assessing whether RIAs have a discriminatory effect is to determine to what extent they
go beyond the GATS in elimination of discrimination in service markets. Given that FDI
will be a major mode of supply, the more RIAs go beyond the GATS, the greater the
potential negative spillovers. 1'
In the EU, there is in principle full freedom to provide services.  However, in
practice this proved difficult  to achieve as national monopolies  and licensing/certification
requirements  constituted  major barriers to cross-border  movement. It was only with the
Single Market or '1992' program that a concerted  effort was made to integrate EU services
markets. All other RIAs are much less far-reaching  than the EU, not least because they do
not involve the supra-national  institutions  that played a major role in the EU in pursuing the
integration objective. The NAFTA has comprehensive  coverage of services  activities, and
liberalizes both cross-border  trade and investment  in services,  but subject  to significant
derogations,  exceptions and reservations.  The Australia-New  Zealand Closer Economic
Relations (CER) trade agreement has also liberalized  trade in most service sectors subject to
a negative list of exceptions. In contrast to NAFTA there are no exemptions of indefinite
duration: the agreement contains provisions  that aim at removing reservations over time,
something that has been occurring steadily over time (Hoekman, 1999).
No specific commitments are made in the Euro-Mediterranean agreements on
liberalization of cross-border supply of services (i.e., trade), nor is there a right of
establishment (Galal and Hoekman, 1997). Liberalization in these areas is an objective
that is to be pursued in the future; commitments are limited to the obligations of each
Party under the GATS, which does not imply much, if any, liberalization. In the case of
the ANDEAN pact, the Central American Common Market (CACM), or the Southern
African Development Community (SADC), little services liberalization has occurred. In
MERCOSUR, free circulation of services is a long term objective to be achieved by 2007.
Progress towards liberalizing service markets has been slow, with members still engaged
in a process of negotiating a framework agreement for liberalization in this sector.
ASEAN members only agreed in 1997 to aim for full liberalization on a preferential basis
of most services by 2020.
Thus, with the notable exception of the EU, trailed by CER and NAFTA, it
appears that the multilateral GATS process is either leading liberalization of services, or
that GATS commitments of RIA members do not differ significantly from their RIA
commitments (Hoekman 1999). Thus, there is not much evidence of large negative
spillovers resulting from RIAs as far as investment is concerned. Most RIAs also do little
I  Of course,  RIAs  may have  negative  effects  on nonmembers  (trade  diversion),  and may  also have  the
effect  of increasing  FDI inflows  into  member  countries  from both  members  and nonmembers.  The focus
here is on the existence  of explicit  discrimination.
14to effectively constrain the ability of governments  to provide incentives for FDI. The
most far-reaching RIAs are those involving the EU as a partner. They seek to apply
common disciplines in areas such as antitrust, state aids, and state monopolies; indeed,
increasingly what appears to be required is the full adoption of the EU's internal market
rules. Periodic disputes regarding the use of incentives by local governments to attract
FDI and recurring claims of "social dumping" illustrate that even the far-reaching EU
disciplines are insufficient to constrain the ability of governments to adopt the tax and
factor market policies they believe will be most conducive to stimulating investment, be
it foreign or domestic.
Insofar as RIAs cause negative investment spillovers-and  there is evidence that
they do-this  will be attenuated if the associated trade discrimination is eroded. This will
occur if the RIA reduces external tariffs and other trade barriers. The focus of multilateral
negotiation efforts should therefore be on multilateralization of intra-regional
liberalization so as to minimize discrimination and reduce the need for restrictive rules of
origin (another instrument of investment diversion). This is likely to be a more feasible
and productive strategy than attempting to strengthen the WTO's disciplines on regional
integration (Winters, 1999).
5. Reputation and Policy Credibility
From a national perspective, a multilateral agreement may help countries that seek FDI as
a signaling device or instrument through which the perceived credibility of a set of
policies intended to foster FDI can be enhanced. It is sometimes argued for example that
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe sought to conclude Association Agreements
with the EU in part to overcome perceptions by foreign investors that they were countries
where there was a high risk of policy reversals and policy uncertainty.' 2 In order to assess
the relevance of the "credibility argument" for an investment agreement, it is necessary to
identify how much of what might be embodied in such an agreement can be pursued and
implemented unilaterally, and, as important, to control for the economic fundamentals.
The experience of transition economies reveals that fundamentals are crucial. Some
countries with Association Agreements have attracted very little FDI (e.g., Bulgaria) in
large part because privatization was not pursued with any vigor, the political environment
was uncertain, and macroeconomic policy such that inflation attained triple digits. The
Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have attracted significant FDI inflows, but it is
unclear what role the investment provisions of the Association Agreements have played.
A case can be made that fundamentals drove these inflows, including privatization, re-
establishment of private property rights, and geographic proximity to Europe (especially
Germany).1 3
12  See Markusen  (1998)  for a discussion  of the "credibility  case" for an investment  agreement;  Fernandez
and Portes  (1998)  for an analysis  of how international  agreement  may support  credibility.
3  See Hoekman  and  Djankov  (1997)  for an empirical  analysis.
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"credibility-enhancing" institutions. One is to commit to accept arbitration of disputes
under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States (ICSID), by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), or
by the UN Committee on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL),' 4 depending on the
preferences of the investor. Sometimes such commitments are embedded in RlAs-e.g.,
NAFTA. Developing countries may also negotiate bilateral investment treaties with the
major home countries of FDI.
Countries that are "in the market" for credibility can also use the existing WTO
disciplines to schedule market access opening  policies for services (including granting of
the right of establishment), and choose to lock in low tariff regimes by binding these
under GATT rules. There is still huge scope for developing countries to use the WTO as a
credibility enhancing instrument-as  noted previously, the coverage of services
commitments is very limited, and tariff bindings for merchandise imports are often
significantly higher than applied rates. Although credibility with respect to investment-
related policies can also be pursued via a multilateral investment agreement, those
governments that are convinced they have a need to use external instruments to achieve
such objectives could start by exploiting existing instruments much more fully.
6. Transactions Costs Arguments for Harmonization of FDI Policies
Governments pursue different policies towards FDI and subject investors to idiosyncratic
regulations. As a result, investors that establish a presence in multiple jurisdictions are
confronted with higher transactions costs than if a global harmonized set of rules were to
exist. As mentioned in the Introduction, some 1,600 BITs are in force, and these also
differ across countries and country-pairs, so that foreign investors are confronted with
differences in the legal security offered by these instruments. Governments are also
confronted with negotiating costs associated with having to establish a series of BITs
with the major source countries, and must consider that industrialized country partner
governments may seek to exploit their greater "market power" to shift the "terms of
trade" to their advantage (e.g., by insisting on provisions that are detrimental to the host
country).
Clearly the need to negotiate BITs will give rise to transactions costs for firms and
governments, but it is not clear how significant these costs are relative to the
counterfactual situation of a "global BIT". This issue is especially relevant if there are
reasons to doubt the outcome of such negotiations, as there should be given the
experience of the OECD. Furthermore, most BITs are rather similar in that they deal with
ensuring non-discriminatory treatment for investors once they have established/invested,
"' An International Centre fore the Settlement of Investment Disputes operates under the aegis of the World
Bank to apply the Convention. The ICC has a Court of Arbitration. UNCITRAL has adopted a set of
Arbitration and Conciliation Rules that can be used in the settlement of commercial disputes.
16and address issues such as dispute settlement and arbitration. With the notable exception
of BITs negotiated by the US, they do not generally address the question of liberalizing
market access. Even assuming that a global BIT would do the same, a case can be made
for diversity, and letting countries design and negotiate BITs in an unconstrained way.
This will ensure that host governments retain their freedom to reflect differences in
national preferences and conditions. Given the existence of international institutions that
provide arbitration services such as the ICC and ICSID, governments can decide
unilaterally whether it is in their interest to use them.
Regarding the costs imposed by the multitude of BITs on multinational firms, it
seems that the major proportion of the transactions costs associated with FDI is likely to
arise from differences in language, culture, politics, and the general business climate of a
host country. Familiarizing oneself with the investment laws of a country seems trivial in
contrast to these more daunting challenges that exist regardless of whether the country is
a signatory to a multilateral or a bilateral investment agreement.
7. Issue Linkage and the "Grand Bargain"
The "grand bargain" argument is one of the raisons d'etre of the WTO. In a nutshell, what
the WTO process does is to allow countries to define a negotiating set that allows a
variety of potential tradeoffs and deals to be crafted that are superior to the status quo
ante. Because countries are restricted to the equivalent of barter trade in multilateral trade
negotiations, to achieve a Pareto superior (cooperative) outcome, issues must be linked.
Determining when such linkage is necessary and successfully designing globally-
beneficial packages is a non-trivial task, given that this occurs in the context of rent-
seeking lobbying and often involves issues that are difficult to analyze (Leidy and
Hoekman, 1993).
In the FDI policy context, the argument is quite simple-this  is a valuable
negotiating chip for developing countries as industrialized nations are the "demandeurs."
Indeed, insofar as governments are in a situation where domestic constraints inhibit the
abolition of restrictive FDI policies, using this "chip" comes at zero cost. Given that for
most developing countries FDI exports is largely a non-issue, a good case can be made
that the quid pro quo for accepting to adopt national treatment, MFN, and the right of
establishment as general multilateral disciplines should be sought outside the investment
area. Examples that have been mentioned include antidumping and restrictive rules of
origin (Moran, 1998). While valid in principle, it is not clear that investment policies are
a particularly valuable "negotiating chip" for developing countries. Other policies are
likely to be more powerful in inducing offsetting "concessions". Among these, further
liberalization of trade under existing agreements (GATT and GATS) figure prominently.
Investment policies may prove useful at the margin, but much can already be (and will
have to be) brought to the negotiating table by developing countries through utilization of
existing mechanisms and instruments.
178. Strengthening the Architecture of the WTO
The current "architecture" of the WTO is quite messy: the WTO is an apex institution
that oversees (embodies) three major multilateral agreements (GATT, GATS, and
TRIPs), membership of which is mandatory, and several "plurilateral" agreements in
which membership is voluntary. All three multilateral agreements focus on trade or
trade-related policies. As is often emphasized in the literature, trade and investment have
increasingly become complementary.  This has been reflected in the WTO in various
ways, perhaps most clearly in the GATS by defining trade as including "commercial
presence" (i.e., FDI) as a mode of supply that is covered by the agreement. It is also
noted often that it will become increasingly difficult to maintain a clear distinction
between trade in goods and trade in services, as technology may give producers the
choice of delivering their products in tangible form or in disembodied form. A priori, it
would appear that any multilateral disciplines should apply equally to international
transactions regardless of the mode of delivery.
A case can be made that WTO members may wish to consider developing
disciplines that distinguish between trade and investment, with trade in goods or services
being subject to a set of common rules, and movement of factors of production being
subject to another set of rules. This in effect has been the approach taken in the NAFTA,
which includes a separate chapter on investment (in goods or services), which is distinct
from the rules relating to cross-border trade (in goods and services). Emulating this
approach would result in much greater consistency and clarity of the applicable rules and
disciplines.
This argument provides a compelling rationale for launching negotiations on FDI-
related policies. Note that an implication is likely to be that movement of labor will be
put on the table as well as movement of capital and know-how (FDI). Purely from an
economic viewpoint, the arguments for free movement of labor are no weaker than those
for the free movement of capital. Clearly, countries that play the role of source countries
in the movement of capital will play the role of host countries in the movement of labor.
A popular developing country perspective is precisely that if we are to put investment on
the agenda of the WTO, why not also add the movement of natural persons?' 5 This is a
difficult issue and the implications of following such a path are far-reaching, as it
involves a complete re-design of the WTO. Furthermore, the arguments involved would
extend quite far from the usual political-economy considerations that figure prominently
in other issues such as liberalization of trade in goods and services. It is unlikely that
goverrnents  will be prepared to far down this path, given the fact that the WTO has only
just been created and that the issues involved become considerably more thorny once
labor mobility is introduced into the mix." 6
'" See Panagariya  (1998)  for arguments  in favor  of movement  of natural  persons  being part of the
negotiating  agenda  from the developing  country  perspective.
6 In fact, purely  from an economic  viewpoint,  the first  best  allocation  of world  resources  requires  free
mobility  of capital  and labor.  Free  trade  in goods  and services  can deliver  the first  best  under factor  price
equalization,  but not otherwise  (Krishna  and Panagariya,  1997).
189. The OECD Negotiations on a Multilateral Agreement on Investment
Starting in 1995, the OECD initiated talks to create a Multilateral Agreement on
Investment (MAI) that would liberalize investment and establish binding dispute
settlement procedures. The OECD talks proved much more difficult than originally
envisaged by participants, and broke down in late 1998, following a decision by France to
cease participating in the negotiations. The reasons for the breakdown were manifold.
Many governments proved unwilling to remove remaining restrictive policies (i.e.,
liberalize), leading to long lists of derogations and exemptions, which reduced the
support of multinationals. Conversely, many NGOs were vehemently opposed to the MAI
draft because they perceived it as giving too much power to foreign investors to contest
host country regulatory policies that would have a detrimental impact on their
investments through provisions on investor-State dispute resolution. The relevant
provisions, which drew on those found in the NAFTA, gave foreign investors the right to
sue governments for damages resulting from violations of the agreement. The concern
was that investors would use these provisions to seek compensation for the costs
associated with the imposition of  domestic environmental, health and safety or zoning
regulations after an investment had occurred (drawing on several cases brought by
foreign investors against NAFTA governments) and that governments would be
constrained in their ability to pursue regulation deemed to be in the national interest
(Kobrin, 1998). Objections were also raised that the rights granted to investors under the
MAI were not balanced by provisions laying out  their responsibilities towards
consumers, workers or the environment. 17
Although much has been made of the investor-State dispute provisions of the
MAI and the impact of a MAI on domestic regulatory sovereignty, much of the
controversy is ill-conceived. There was nothing in the MAI (or in NAFTA) that prevents
governments from pursuing regulatory policies-the  main issue here was that foreign
investors would be granted stronger rights to claim compensation than domestic
counterparts. Clearly this is a matter that should be the subject of domestic debate. All
governments must address the issue of compensating affected interests for regulatory
"takings". One option would have been to extend "MAI" rights to all affected parties;
another to define when such claims may be made.
MAI negotiations were made more difficult as well because they went beyond
FDI to cover intangible capital (know-how) and portfolio capital. Especially with respect
to the latter many governments were unwilling to make binding commitments that might
affect their ability to regulate such flows. Finally, many NGOs objected to the fact that
MAI negotiations were undertaken by government officials who made little effort to
engage or inform national legislatures and civil society more generally, while favoring
business interests in terms of access and provision of information.
7 For an overview of the arguments made by NGOs against the MAI, see Vallianatos (1998).
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far-reaching than what is often found in the bilateral investment agreements between
high-income and developing countries (Sauve, 1998), reducing the interest of the
business community to push for the agreement. The vociferous opposition by a well-
organized network of NGOs made a number of governments, particularly France, less
inclined to move forward as well. What is particularly noteworthy from the perspective of
this paper is that the MAI included no disciplines in the area of incentives. National
treatment would apply to foreign investors, but any government could go beyond this and
discriminate in favor of a foreign investor (by providing a subsidy). Together with the
long lists of derogations to national treatment, this suggests that at least two of the
potential rationales for international agreement were not satisfied in the MAI context.
10. Towards a WTO Agreement on FDI-Related Policies?
Investment has been proposed as a subject for future WTO negotiations. A recent WTO
report on investment in the global economy concludes that:
"WTO members are confronted with a basic policy choice: Do they continue to
approach the FDI issue as they have until now, that is bilaterally, regionally and
plurilaterally, and on an ad hoc basis through sectoral and other specific WTO
agreements; or do they seek to integrate such arrangements into a comprehensive
and global framework that recognizes the close linkages between trade and
investment, assures the compatibility of investment and trade rules and, most of
all, takes into account in a balanced way the interests of all the members of the
WTO-developed,  developing and least developed alike.  Only a multilateral
negotiation  in the WTO,  when appropriate,'8 can provide  such a global and
balanced framework" (WTO, 1996, p. 59).
With the demise of the OECD-based efforts to negotiate a MAI, the WTO is the
main game in town for those seeking to negotiate general rules on FDI, although some
have argued in favor of UJNCTAD.  RIAs are clearly an alternative, but are an inferior
instrument from a global perspective as they may distort the pattern of FDI flows, either
by discriminating against investors located in non-members, or by creating incentives for
FDI from any source to locate in a specific country. The latter can arise in so-called "hub
and spoke" free trade agreements, where a country has a series of bilateral FTAs, but the
various partner countries do not have FTAs with each other. In such situations investors
may choose to locate in the "hub" country simply because this gives them access to all
the "spoke" countries, not because it is the optimal location on economic fundamentals.
An exception to this argument arises if greater credibility can be obtained through a
regional than through a multilateral agreement. Although in principle this can be
important (Fernandez and Portes, 1998), in practice it does not appear to apply to most
8 The italics have been added by us to emphasize that even the WTO document admits the possibility that
the timne  may not be ripe yet for such negotiations.
20RIAs extant, the Association Agreements between the EU and the Central and Eastern
European countries being a possible exception.
A number of WTO agreements already embody or imply disciplines on
investment-related policies (see WTO 1996 for a review). The TRIMs agreement contains
language requiring a review of the agreement by 2000, which is to include consideration
whether the agreement should be complemented  with provisions relating to investment
policies. A central question is whether the net gains of negotiating a feasible general
agreement under WTO auspices are large enough. Alternatively put, the issue is to decide
whether or not to continue the existing piecemeal approach. In answering this question it
is useful to return to some of the key issues identified in the Introduction: what would an
agreement do for developing countries in terms of fostering "good" FDI-related policies
and generating better access to foreign markets through FDI; addressing negative
international spillovers; enhancing policy credibility; and reducing transactions costs for
multinationals and governments?
Most FDI takes place between high-income countries that have similar factor
endowments. The fact that these flows of FDI occurred in the absence of multilateral
disciplines raises immediate questions regarding the relevance of such an agreement. It
could be argued that FDI flows would have been still higher if disciplines had existed.
The policy environment across the developed world is on the whole more uniform than it
is across developing countries, so that the value of implementing common rules
governing FDI is potentially higher for them. FDI flows into such countries have
increased substantially in the last decade; they now attract some thirty percent of the total
(UNCTAD, 1996). However, the distribution is very skewed, reflecting that what matters
in terms of attracting FDI are the fundamentals, including political stability, geography,
natural endowments, an efficient infrastructure, good human capital, and liberal trade
policies. An investment treaty will do little for countries in attracting FDI if these
fundamental requirements are not in place.
Increasing access to foreign markets through FDI does not appear to be a priority
issue for most developing countries. The important questions therefore are whether an
agreement can help to reduce or offset the political impediments that constrain adopting
domestic policies and procedures that will be more conducive to attracting FDI, and
whether it can address international policy spillovers.
Restrictive policies
The TRIMs agreement does not address purely domestic policy regimes that raise
the cost of market access or restrict establishment by  foreign investors. As noted earlier,
to be useful to countries that face difficulties in reforming the regulatory and business
environment, the process of negotiating an investment agreement must allow issues to be
brought to the table that are of sufficient interest to domestic constituencies for them to
invest resources to fight for a better investment regime. Necessary conditions are that
there are restrictive policies that have proven impossible to eliminate unilaterally, and
21that there are issue linkages that can break the domestic deadlock. Foreign pressure for
market access may be enough in itself, but generally source country interest groups
seeking such access will have to bring something to the table to motivate constituencies
in host countries to assist them. The regional experience suggests that as far as
developing countries are concerned it may not be easy to devise such an agreement-
most do not go much beyond the WTO. The OECD experience illustrates that limiting
attention to investment policies only can be a recipe for failure-the  agenda needs to be
broader to allow tradeoffs and issue linkages. If so, a multilateral agreement that
embodies disciplines on the regulatory environment might prove valuable to developing
countries that confront difficulties in removing redundant red tape unilaterally.
That said, one can ask what deserves priority. From an economic perspective we
would argue that priority should focus on eliminating entry restrictions. These are mostly
binding in service industries. As noted previously, red tape restrictions on inward FDI
may be motivated in part by the existence of high trade barriers. If so, priority should be
given to trade liberalization to facilitate imports. Liberalization of FDI restrictions and
procedures is most important for non-tradables. The key need therefore is to continue the
process of multilateral liberalization of trade, focusing particular attention on reducing the
extent of discrimination by expanding the coverage of specific commitments for services
markets under the GATS, which already covers investment as a mode of supply.
International policy spillovers
Turning to the systemic issue of international policy spillovers, a potentially strong
argument in favor of a multilateral agreement is that it could help avoid mutually
destructive policies from the viewpoint of developing countries eager to attract FDI via
the use of incentives. As noted in Section 3, we regard the economics of the negative
spillover case as being weak. For one, a number of studies find that fiscal incentives have
little if any impact on the location decisions of foreign investors. Even if one does not
accept this conclusion-and  clearly the jury is still out-it  is not clear there is an
international public good case for cooperation.  Competition (non-cooperation) could be
welfare improving for the world as a whole (Bond and Samuelson, 1986; Caves, 1996).
Nevertheless, one should be careful to distinguish the efficiency issue from the issue of
transfer of rents: competition for FDI may lead to an efficient outcome but yet fail to be
in the interest of the developing countries competing for such investment. Of course, the
argument for policy coordination then amounts to collusion between developing countries
in order to restrict transfers to multinational firms, and is therefore, on weaker grounds.
Moreover, to be effective in disciplining the use of firm-specific fiscal incentives,
any agreement arguably would need to be quite comprehensive. It would need to cover
not only firm-specific investment incentives, but also taxation, competition regimes, and
deal with the discrimination that is created by RIAs to ensure countries cannot side-step
the disciplines on financial incentives through the use of such policies. The GATT/WTO
negotiating and implementation history illustrates that agreement on subsidy and related
disciplines is very hard to obtain, and that disciplines are easily circumvented. Even RIAs
22such as the EU-which  go much further than the WTO in this area-have  encountered
recurrent difficulties associated with government policies intended to attract FDI.
NAFTA does not even try to tackle this issue.
11. Concluding Remarks
Negotiating a WTO agreement on investment policies may prove useful in arriving at a
"grand bargain" that extends to issues of particular interest to developing countries. This
possibility must be considered carefully, as there may be significant scope for obtaining
large returns in other areas as a quid pro quo for participating in an investment
agreement. A broader agenda will be necessary both for countries that confront domestic
political economy constraints on the adoption of better FDI policies, and for those that
seek to use FDI policies strategically. Devising a grand bargain will be  difficult. Account
must be taken of the potential downside-issue  linkage can be a two-edged sword.
Efforts to expand the agenda may allow groups in society to seek cross-issue linkages in
areas such as the environment or labor standards that could be detrimental to the original
raison d'etre of the WTO: to progressively liberalize international trade. Bhagwati (1998)
has argued that this Pandora's box possibility provides a powerful justification for
leaving general investment rules off the WTO agenda.
The failure of the OECD to reach an agreement on a MAI illustrates the practical
difficulties that will arise. The diversity in the policy environment across countries
creates significant room for skepticism regarding the success of negotiations regarding an
agreement on investment. If OECD countries, with their much more uniform policy
environment and similar goals fail to reach an accord, how can one expect developing
countries that differ more substantially from one another to agree on a common set of
principles regarding investment?
In our view priority should be given to the pursuit of "classic" trade liberalization
to ensure markets for tradable goods are contestable through exports. This should include
efforts to liberalize access to service markets on a nondiscriminatory basis, an area where
establishment (FDI) is often crucial. Continued nondiscriminatory liberalization of trade
barriers for goods and services will also help reduce possible locational distortions for
FDI resulting from RIAs and discipline the ability of countries to pursue strategic
policies, as trade policy is a vital element of any such strategy. While the elimination of
trade policy as an instrument to transfer profits is in theory possibly detrimental to
developing countries, in practice such policies are very difficult to design and implement.
Any potential losses are likely to be offset many times over by the efficiency gains from
trade liberalization. Moreover, countries obtain compensation in a mercantilist sense as
well, as trade liberalization in foreign markets will be obtained as a quid pro quo.
The fact that the GATS includes establishment as a mode of supply on which
commitments can be made significantly weakens the economic case for making a stand-
alone investment agreement in the WTO a negotiating priority. Once substantial further
progress has been made to liberalize trade in goods and services on a nondiscriminatory
23basis, including market access through establishment in (nontradable) service activities, it
will become much clearer whether the potential benefits of seeking general rules on
investment policies are large enough to justify launching a multilateral negotiation in this
area. While we support the applicability of general WTO principles such as national
treatment, MFN, transparency etc. in the area of investment, our point is simply that such
principles can already be implemented  within existing agreements. The rather limited
applicability of the national treatment instrument in the GATS suggests that this is not the
appropriate time to consider launching negotiations on investment policies.
Although we are pessimistic about the need for-and  feasibility of-negotiating  a
multilateral agreement on investment at this time, the conclusion that new multilateral
rules are not really needed is a positive one. It implies that governments can achieve
much of what is beneficial unilaterally-including  application of the principles of
national treatment and MFN, and adoption of the right of establishment in national law. It
also implies governments do not have to invest resources to negotiate in (another) new
area and can instead use existing institutions and mechanisms to liberalize access to
markets. Over time, the architectural argument in favor of common disciplines for trade
in goods or services, and common rules relating to the treatment of foreign factors of
production, will become stronger. The more trade barriers and barriers to establishment in
services have been reduced in the interim, the greater the feasibility of undertaking a
general overhaul of the WTO may become.
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